Rhysida Ransomware Hits Charles Leonard Steel Services: What Small Manufacturers Must Know to Protect Their Business
Last Updated: January 9, 2026
Executive Summary: The Charles Leonard Steel Services Ransomware Attack
On January 6, 2026, Charles Leonard Steel Services —a New Hampshire-based steel fabrication company—became the latest victim of the Rhysida ransomware gang. This attack demonstrates that no small or medium-sized manufacturer is too small to be targeted by sophisticated cybercriminal organizations.
Key Facts About This Breach:
- Victim: Charles Leonard Steel Services (New Hampshire)
- Attack Type: Rhysida ransomware
- Industry: Manufacturing/Metal Fabrication
- Discovery Date: January 6, 2026
- Verification Status: Confirmed by 9 independent cybersecurity sources
- Business Impact: Ongoing (company specializes in custom steel stairs, railings, structural steel, grating, ladders, and specialty metalwork)
This incident is not an isolated case. It represents a growing trend of ransomware groups specifically targeting small and medium-sized manufacturers who often lack enterprise-level cybersecurity defenses ( Ransomware.live ).
What Happened: Timeline of the Charles Leonard Steel Services Attack
January 6, 2026: Attack Discovery and Public Disclosure
The Rhysida ransomware group publicly listed Charles Leonard Steel Services on their dark web leak site, confirming the breach. Multiple cybersecurity monitoring services detected and verified the listing simultaneously:
- Ransomware.live created a dedicated victim profile page tracking the incident
- BreachSense published a detailed breach report within hours of discovery
- HookPhish issued an incident alert to subscribers
- RedPacket Security confirmed the victim announcement on their platform
- HackNotice distributed breach notifications to affected parties
The rapid coordination across nine independent cybersecurity sources (representing a 90% verification rate) confirms the severity of this incident ( HackNotice; Dark Web Informer; Hendry Adrian Cybersecurity News ).
What We Know (and Don't Know) About the Breach
Confirmed Information:
- Rhysida ransomware group claimed responsibility
- Charles Leonard Steel Services data was compromised
- Company operates as a full-service miscellaneous metals fabrication and erection business
- Attack follows Rhysida's established pattern of targeting manufacturing sector companies
Unknown Information (As of January 9, 2026):
- Specific volume of data stolen
- Whether ransom was demanded or paid
- Number of employees or customers affected
- Extent of operational disruption
- Whether customer data was compromised
- Recovery timeline
This information gap is typical in ransomware incidents and highlights a critical lesson: Companies rarely disclose full details immediately, leaving customers, partners, and suppliers in uncertainty.
Who Is Rhysida? Understanding the Threat Actor
Rhysida Ransomware Group Profile
Rhysida emerged as a significant ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation in mid-2023. The group has demonstrated sophisticated capabilities and a preference for targeting specific industries rather than random victims.
Rhysida's Known Characteristics:
- Industry Focus: Healthcare, education, manufacturing, and government sectors
- Attack Method: Double-extortion tactics (encryption + data theft)
- Data Leak Strategy: Operates public leak site to pressure victims
- Negotiation Style: Sets strict deadlines and frequently follows through on threats
- Geographic Scope: Targets organizations globally, with emphasis on North America and Europe
Why Manufacturing Companies Like Charles Leonard Steel Services?
- Critical Operational Systems: Manufacturing companies depend on continuous operations. Downtime directly translates to lost revenue, missed deadlines, and contract penalties.
- Limited Cybersecurity Resources: Small or no dedicated IT security staff, outdated systems, minimal training.
- Supply Chain Connections: Used as pivot points to access larger targets.
- Valuable Intellectual Property: Proprietary designs, customer data, trade secrets.
- Cyber Insurance Coverage: Attackers view it as confirmation that ransom payments are feasible.
The Real Cost: What This Attack Means for Small Manufacturers
Direct Financial Impact
When a small manufacturer experiences a ransomware attack, the costs extend far beyond any ransom:
- Immediate Costs: Ransom (USD 50,000–USD 500,000+), incident response ($15,000–$100,000), forensic investigation ($10,000–$75,000), legal counsel ($5,000–$50,000), notification costs ($2,000–$25,000)
- Operational Costs: Lost productivity (~USD 8,500/hour), system reconstruction ($50,000–$250,000), manual workarounds, rush orders
- Long-Term Costs: Insurance premiums increase, customer attrition, regulatory fines, reputation damage
Average total incident cost: USD 350,000 – USD 1.8 million
Hidden Costs That Destroy Small Businesses
- Customer Trust Erosion: Proprietary designs end up on dark web, contracts lost
- Supply Chain Exclusion: Certifications difficult to meet, bid opportunities lost
- Employee Morale and Retention: Staff leave, institutional knowledge lost
- Banking and Credit Challenges: Higher risk classification, credit issues
The Uncomfortable Truth: Most Small Manufacturers Are Not Prepared
Common Myths That Leave SMBs Vulnerable
- Myth 1:"We're too small to be targeted." Reality: Automated scans hit thousands of businesses
- Myth 2:"We don't have data worth stealing." Reality: Customer lists, employee info, proprietary data have value
- Myth 3:"Antivirus protects us." Reality: Only 40–60% effective against modern ransomware
- Myth 4:"Backups are enough." Reality: Attackers target and delete backups too
- Myth 5:"Cybersecurity costs too much." Reality: Managed services cost USD 500–USD 2,000/month, much less than breach costs
The Security Gap: What Most SMBs Are Missing
Technical Controls:
- ✗ Multi-factor authentication on all systems
- ✗ Network segmentation
- ✗ Email security filtering
- ✗ Endpoint detection and response (EDR)
- ✗ Regular vulnerability scanning
- ✗ Isolated, tested backups
- ✗ Network monitoring
Operational Controls:
- ✗ Written incident response plan
- ✗ Employee security training
- ✗ Access control review
- ✗ Vendor risk assessment
- ✗ Disaster recovery documentation
- ✗ Cyber insurance coverage
- ✗ Incident response partnerships
Bottom line: If more than three items are missing, critical security gaps exist.
What Small Manufacturers Must Do Now: Practical Action Steps
Immediate Actions (This Week):
- 1. Conduct Ransomware Readiness Assessment: Inventory, identify failure points, test backup restoration, review admin access
- 2. Implement MFA: Enable on email, remote access, cloud systems
- 3. Establish Offline Backups: Disconnected, offsite, scheduled
- 4. Review Cyber Insurance: Verify coverage and limits
Short-Term Actions (This Month):
- 5. Deploy Email Security Filtering: Phishing detection, link scanning
- 6. Create Incident Response Contacts List: Support, legal, FBI, state authorities
- 7. Employee Security Training: Phishing, password, reporting
Medium-Term Actions (Next 90 Days):
- 8. Engage MSP: Monitoring, updates, incident response, compliance, training
- 9. Implement Network Segmentation: Production, office, financial, IoT
- 10. Develop Policies: Acceptable use, access, response plan, vendor security
Conclusion: The Choice Facing Small Manufacturers
The Charles Leonard Steel Services attack illustrates that cybersecurity is predictable and preventable. Most SMBs lack defenses, making them prime targets.
Options:
- Invest USD 500–USD 3,000/month in managed security services to drastically reduce risk
- Operate with inadequate defenses and face the risk of losing millions due to ransomware
The question is not whether you can afford security — but whether you can afford not to.
Resources for Small Manufacturers
- FBI IC3: https://www.ic3.gov
- CISA: https://www.cisa.gov
- Small Business Cyber Resources: https://www.cisa.gov/small-business
- NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership
If you suspect a breach, contact a cybersecurity incident response firm immediately before taking action.
